Abstract. This paper analyzes the effects of regulatory uncertainty regarding labor costs on investment in a liberalized market. We distinguish between the external investment margin (market entry) and the internal investment margin (technology), and establish that regulatory uncertainty affects these margins differently, encouraging market entry, but discouraging technological investment. As a consequence, the impact of regulatory uncertainty on competition in liberalized markets is a combination of these two countervailing forces.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, various formerly state-controlled markets have been liberalized in many countries. Examples include markets for electricity, gas, transportation, water, and communication. At the outset, these markets were controlled by state-owned monopolies; one of the objectives of liberalization is to encourage market entry by new firms, thereby increasing competition in the market. For new firms to be competitive, investment in technology is generally required. This study focuses on market entry and investment in competitiveness.
Prior to market liberalization, formerly state-controlled firms were frequently able to provide their employees with very favorable working conditions (in terms of wages and other benefits) because of their strong and often unchallenged market positions. Following liberalization, these conditions often could not be changed for legal reasons. One pertinent question is, to what extent regulatory intervention will confer these benefits on the employees of new competitors, seeking a level playing field with the incumbent firm. As political parties tend to disagree in their views, a prolonged debate can ensue, increasing cost uncertainty for new and potential entrants. A case in point is the German postal market, which is dominated by the former monopolist Deutsche Post. 1 The postal market was extensively liberalized at the beginning of 2008, allowing private companies entry into the market for letters. However, parallel to these changes, a discussion emerged regarding the introduction of a minimum wage, making use of a law labeled Entsendegesetz (Posted Worker Act), which is a construct allowing the conferral of union-bargained wages across the entire sector. In 2008, this minimum wage came into effect. The corresponding wage levels considerably increased the labor costs of new entrants. In contrast, the labor costs of Deutsche Post remained more or less unaffected, since employees' salaries at Deutsche Post were high to begin with. Subsequently, the enforcement of the minimum wage was challenged in the courts by the new postal firms and was finally ruled invalid in January 2009; the court's arguments were based on the lack of consultation with new firms in the process of enacting the law. Whether a renewed attempt for the introduction of a minimum wage will be undertaken remains uncertain. All in all, the situation is one of uncertainty over labor costs for the new competitors of Deutsche Post. It has been argued that these circumstances seriously lower the investment incentives of potential entrants (e.g., 'Bitte kippen!', Die Zeit 21 January 2010). While not specifically addressing the particularities of the German postal market, our paper seeks to establish the repercussions of this type of regulatory uncertainty on market entry and technological investment decisions, using a simple theoretical framework.
The effect of uncertainty on investment decisions has been extensively discussed using dynamic models, beginning with the contributions by Abel (1983) and Hartman (1972) . Subsequent analyses include those of Abel and Eberly (1994) and Nakamura (1999) . In addition, the real-option approach, in which the focus is on the timing of investment, has often been used to investigate the effects of uncertainty on investment levels (see, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . In contrast to these branches of the literature, we focus on the distinction between the internal and external investment margin and analyze a static framework, thereby excluding deferral of investment. In a related study, Tyagi (2006) provides an analysis regarding uncertainty in the context of the introduction of a new product. In addition, uncertainty in oligopolistic settings has been widely discussed for the case in which uncertainty is resolved only after quantity/price decisions have been made and firms may decide on costly information acquisition (see, e.g., Christen, 2005; Vives, 1999) . In our setup, quantity/price decisions are made after the uncertainty has been resolved.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we present the model to be implemented. The analysis of this model is described in Section 3. Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
THE MODEL
We consider a market for a homogeneous product with an indirect demand function p = a À bQ, where Q is the amount of the good traded and a, b > 0. There is an incumbent firm, M, endowed with production technology q M ¼ a M l M , where q M , a M , l M denote output, labor productivity, and labor input, respectively. The incumbent might be challenged by a new entrant, E. Market entry, the external investment margin, is associated with fixed costs K, drawn from an interval ½K; K according to the cumulative distribution function G(K). Upon entry, E decides on technological investment T, which determines labor productivity according to a E ðTÞ, where a
The incumbent is legally required to pay a wage equal to w M . For the potential entrant E, there is regulatory uncertainty over the wages it must pay. A priori, before the decisions on market entry and technology investment are made, only the distribution for the corresponding wage w E in the interval ½w;
w is known, where we denote the cumulative distribution function by Fðw E ; rÞ and the mean value by m. The parameter r is thought of as a measure of the distribution's riskiness. In the following analysis, our focus is on the uncertainty parameter r and its influence on a potential entrant's internal and external investment margins. Applying a mean preserving spread (see, e.g., Gravelle and Rees, 2004; Laffont, 1989; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970, p. 482 ), we will consider wage distribution two riskier than distribution one for r 2 [ r 1 when m 1 ¼ m 2 and R w w ½Fðw E ; r 2 Þ À Fðw E ; r 1 Þdw E ! 0 for all w with strict inequality for at least one permissible value of w. This additionally implies that R w w ½Fðw E ; r 2 Þ À Fðw E ; r 1 Þdw E ¼ 0 holds (see, e.g., Laffont, 1989, p. 25) . We will present a uniform distribution for w E as an illustrative example at the end of our analysis.
The time structure of the game can be summarized as follows: At Stage 0 of the game, competitor E makes a decision about market entry after observing the level of entry costs K. At Stage 1, given market entry, firm E determines its technological investment T; at Stage 2, wages w E are realized and production takes place. Competition at Stage 2 is assumed to be in labor inputs, which are chosen simultaneously, with l E denoting firm E's labor input.
2 We solve the model by backward induction.
THE ANALYSIS
The model described in the previous section has been purposefully kept simple in many ways to maintain focus on the central issue in this study -namely, identification of the repercussions of regulatory uncertainty on the investment of potential market entrants at the external and internal investment margins. The analysis begins at the last stage, in which firms determine profit-maximizing levels of labor input for the investment decisions made at earlier stages.
Stage 2: Firm j's profits, j = E,M, are given by
with i = E,M and i6 ¼j. Objective function (1) gives rise to the first-order condition for an interior solution:
Solving for equilibrium labor inputs, we arrive at
2. Neither the consideration of price competition with heterogeneous goods nor the possibility of the incumbent acting as a Stackelberg leader would affect our qualitative findings.
which corresponds to standard results in industrial organization (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988) . From (3), it is clear that a comparatively low wage level implies a comparatively large market share, ceteris paribus. It is precisely this comparative advantage that new entrants might enjoy that motivates formerly state-owned incumbents to lobby for the transferral of employees' rights to their new competitors. For the analysis of investment decisions, an entrant's profits are decisive. At wage w E and investment T, these profits are given by
With w E a E ðTÞ as the unit costs for firm E, a higher level of w E makes firm E relatively less competitive, whereas a higher level of T makes firm E relatively more competitive. This completes the description of Stage 2 of the game.
Stage 1: Firm E determines investment T to maximize expected profits net investment cost, P E , i.e.,
The first-order condition corresponding to (7) results as
We assume that expected profits are concave in the investment level T, which assures that the second-order condition for a maximum is fulfilled. Condition (8) demonstrates that the marginal benefit of greater investment at the internal investment margin is the increase in expected profits at Stage 2, as described in (6). The expectation operator is the result of regulatory uncertainty.
Given an interior solution for the optimal level of T, we determine how optimal investment is affected by the measure of regulatory uncertainty r. To do so, we evaluate how the sign of the partial derivative @P E =@T changes when r increases from r 1 to r 2 at the point at which @P E =@T ¼ 0 holds for r 1 . This sign indicates how the optimal investment will change. In accordance with Gravelle and Rees (2004, pp. 481-483) , among others, we establish that the sign of the change of the partial derivative is equal to the sign of the term
The above term (9) shows that the influence of an increase in r on optimal investment depends on the gradient of @p Ã E ðw E Þ=@T at the upper limit of the distribution for w E and the curvature with respect to w E . Moreover, for a mean preserving spread, the first term in (9) is equal to zero, and thus only the curvature is decisive for the impact of regulatory uncertainty on the investment level. Since
we establish that
As a consequence, we assert that the derivative of profits with respect to investment in technology is a strictly concave function of the wage level w E , i.e., the impact of w E on the desirability of technological investment diminishes with the wage level. Accordingly, optimal investment depends negatively on uncertainty (as measured by r), given a mean preserving spread,
The arguments presented above are summarized in the following result:
Proposition 1. For a mean preserving spread and given interior solutions for employment levels, the profit-maximizing investment at the internal margin decreases with the uncertainty measure.
This finding can be explained as follows: An increase in the wage level reduces labor input, which makes investment less profitable because any cost-saving effects will apply to fewer output units. As labor input decreases linearly with the wage level, see (3), this effect is more pronounced for higher wages. This explains the concavity of the partial derivative and translates into diminished incentives for investment in technology when uncertainty is higher.
In the next step of our analysis of the investment repercussions of regulatory uncertainty, we turn to Stage 0, at which the entrant makes the decision of whether or not to enter the market.
Stage 0: The entry decision can be described as a comparison of fixed entry costs K and expected profits net of investment costs P Ã E . Note that P Ã E incorporates the privately optimal decisions on technology and labor input. K is derived from the cumulative distribution function G(K), and market entry occurs when P Ã E ! K; therefore, the probability for market entry, given by GðP Ã E Þ, increases with P Ã E . The likelihood of market entry increases in the uncertainty parameter r. Applying the method used in (9), we obtain the following result for the difference in expected profits
where r 1 \ r 2 . For a mean preserving spread, the first term in (13) is equal to zero, and from (5) we obtain
which establishes a strictly convex relationship. Consequently, expected profits strictly increase with the uncertainty measure r for any mean preserving spread, implying an increase in the probability of market entry for higher values of r. In other words, the increase in uncertainty allows firms to enter the market despite higher entry costs. This finding can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2. Given interior employment levels, any mean preserving spread of the distribution of wages is favorable for profit-maximizing investment at the external margin, i.e., market entry becomes more likely.
This finding may be justified as follows: The convex relationship between profits and wages stems from the fact that firms adjust labor input according to the wage level. Higher wages reduce optimal labor input due to higher labor costs. Because firms are able to adjust labor input, profits are a strictly convex function of labor costs, i.e., the second derivative is positive. This translates into higher expected profits net investment costs when uncertainty over wage levels rises.
For an easily accessible illustration, let us briefly refer to a uniform distribution of w E in the interval [m À r/2,m + r/2], implying a density of 1/r. Starting from
@T 2 , the cross-derivative of interest is given by
The first two terms in the parentheses represent a convex combination of the derivative evaluated at the upper and lower bound of integration, whereas the third term takes into account the actual values of the derivative for all levels of w E in [m À r/2,m + r/2]. The negative sign of the cross-derivative follows from the concavity of @p
the positive sign following from the convexity of the profit function with respect to wages. This study addresses the impact of regulatory uncertainty on investment. Proposition 1 established that in our model, a sufficient condition to validate the widespread claim that higher uncertainty decreases investment at the internal margin is that of a mean-preserving spread of the wage distribution. In contrast, as detailed in Proposition 2, for any mean preserving spread, market entry is actually more likely in a setting characterized by regulatory uncertainty. As a result, it is not clear that the presence of regulatory uncertainty hinders the common policy objective of transforming formerly state-controlled industries into competitive markets.
Before concluding our study, we briefly comment on the welfare effects of higher uncertainty. 4 Focusing on a mean preserving spread, and using the sum of expected consumer and producer surplus minus potential entry and investment costs as a welfare criterion, we can establish three different effects resulting from higher uncertainty. First, market entry for a new competitor becomes more likely; this implies a benefit for consumers, as there is a higher probability that the duopoly outcome will occur. The expected profit of the incumbent firm will be lower; in contrast, for the entrant, additional profits will cancel out additional entry costs. Second, increased uncertainty lowers investment at the internal margin in the event of market entry. This reduces consumer surplus, but increases the incumbent's profits, while leaving the entrant's profits unchanged at the margin. Finally, the impact of uncertainty on social welfare depends on what may be called the 'risk-attitude' of society -that is, whether or not social welfare is concave or convex with respect to the entrant's wage level. In our set-up, the sum of consumer and producer surpluses is convex with respect to the entrant's wages, which adds to the positive effects of uncertainty on social welfare. However, it cannot be unambiguously established whether positive or negative effects regarding welfare will dominate.
CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on industries in which there is a strong formerly state-owned incumbent that may be disadvantaged due to previously negotiated institutional arrangements. In this context, one relevant policy question is, to what extent regulatory intervention will impose similar arrangements on new competitors in the pursuit of creating a level playing field with incumbent firms. Prolonged debate on this issue can create regulatory uncertainty. In our model, we have explored the popular claim that such regulatory circumstances seriously lower the investment incentives of potential entrants.
In summary, our analysis indicates that while regulatory uncertainty over the level of labor costs lowers incentives for investment in technology, it increases the probability of market entry. Consequently, regulatory uncertainty does not necessarily discourage competition in formerly state-run industries. All in all, the results corroborate the view that the evaluation of investment incentives in the presence of regulatory uncertainty demands detailed analysis rather than hasty and unsupported speculation.
